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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
EDDIE SOLIZ and VIDALE
SOLIZ, 'by Eddie Soliz,
her Guardian Ad Litem,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
EDWARD WILSION
AMMERMAN, 'by his
Guardi1an Ad Litem, LaVerne
Bruce Ammerman, and
LaVERNE BRUCE
AM'ME'RMAN,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
10028

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATE·MENT OF CASE
This action is one brought by Eddie Soliz and
his daughter, Vidale Soliz, to recover damages for
personal injuries alleged to have been received in
an automobile accident which occurred on March
21, 1962 at the intersection of Second West and
200 North Street in Salt Lake City, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER CO'URT
Two defendants were named in plaintiffs' Complaint, Edward Wilson Ammerman and his father,
La\Terne Bruce Ammerman. At the pre-trial of the
action plaintiffs acknowledged that they had no
1
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evidence of any agency rela1tionshi p which existed
between Edward Wilson Ammerman and his father,
LaVerne Bruce Ammerman, whereupon the case
was dismissed as against LaVerne Bruce Ammerman, leJaving only the defendant Edward Wilson
Ammerman in the case ( R. 28).
The action was tried to a jury in Salt Lake
County, Utah commencing September 24, 1'963. A
verdict was rendered i n favor of Vidale Soliz in the
amount of $89.00 special damages land $500.00 general damages. The Judgment thereafter entered
upon this verdict was satisfied by the defendant
and is not involved in this cruse.
A verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff Eddie Soliz and against the defendant in the
amount of $446.25 special damages and '$1'5,000.00
general damages. A Motion For New Trial was filed
in the action brought by Eddie Soliz and was denied
by the lower court.
1

REILIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant asks that the order of the lower
court, denyi1ng 'appellant's Motion For New Trial,
be reversed and that the jury verdict in the case
brought by Eddie Soliz be set aside, 1and that the
appellant be awarded a new trial upon the following grounds :
(a) The court erred in permitting
plaintiff to recall Dr. D. C. Bernrson for a
second time after the defendant's doctor had
testified, and in not limliting Dr. Bernson's
1
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testimony to a rebuttal of matters testified to
by defendant's doctor;
(b) The court erred in refusing x-rays
received as exhibits in the case to be taken
into the jury room;
(c) The court erred in its instructions
given to the jury; and
(d) The verdict of the jury herein is
excessive and appears to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
STA:TEMENT OF FACTS
The automobile accident which gave rise to this
action occurred on March 21, 19H2 at the intersection of Second West and 200 North Streets in Salt
Lake City, Utah at about 8:15 o'clock A.M. (R.
251). Plaintiff Eddie Soliz was operating a motor
vehicle and traveling south on Second West Street
in the outside lane of two south-bound lanes. Two
of his children were with him. His son, Eddie Soliz,
Jr., was s~ated in the middle of the front seat and
his daughter, Vidale Soliz (the other plaintiff), was
seated on the right side of the front seat. Plaintiff
planned to drop Vi dale off at the West High School
and Eddie, Jr. at Horace Mann, where the two
children attended school ( R. 251) .
Eddie Soliz testified that as he approached the
intersection the traffic light at the intersection was
red. It changed to green when he was ·20 to 30 feet
from the intersection. He observed the first of two
3
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automobiles which proceeded north through the intersection (R. 25'3) and then saw a second car
(defendant's) turn toward the curb but, in his
words, "didn't think he was going a:ll the way" (R.
324).
Defendant EdWiard Wilson Ammerman was
traveling north on Second West Street, intending
to make a left hand turn at the intersection of 200
North and Second West. He was traveling in the
lane next 'to the center. The traffic light a't the intersection wa:s red when he reached the intersection.
He stopped his vehicle behind another automobile
which Wias stopped. When the traffic light turned
green for north-south bound traffic the first car
proceeded straight on through the intersection (R.
204). He moved his car into the intersection and
came to a second stop in the intersection long enough
for the intersection to clear so that he could proceed to make his turn ( R. 205). He did not give an
arm signal but had hi's left hand turn signal light
operating (R. 206). After pausing momentarily
and checking traffic to the north, at which time he
did not see the Soliz vehicle, he started his left turn,
whereupon the collision occurred, the point of impact being on the outside lane of traffic on the
west side of Second West ( R. 208). Mter the impact Eddie Soliz told 'the defendant "he was trying
to make the lights to get his kids to school". On the
basis of the foregoing testimony the Court found
negligence :a.s a m'atter of law on the part of the
4
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defendant Edward Wilson Ammerman but submitted the issue of contributory negligence to the
jury.
Immediately after the colli'Sion plaintiff and
his daughter visited the office of Dr. David E. Smith,
the family physician. Plaintiff stated he was nervous and upset and that he had struck his chest
on the steering wheel, but did not have much in
the way of complaints at the time. Dr. Smith testified that he checked the plaintiff over and found
nothing significant other than a bruise (R. 124125). On the 29th day of Ma~h, 1'9H2 plaintiff
·again visited Dr. Smith. At that time he complained
of pain in the central and left area of his chest. A
cardiogram was performed and found to 'be normal
(R. 125). Thereafter, on April 10, 1'96~2, some
twenty days after the accident, the plain tiff again
Yisited Dr. Smith, complaining of low back pains
and some neck pain with radi'ation into his arms
and some difficulty in using his hands ( R. 125).
Dr. Smith further testified that plaintiff hiad never
made such complaints prior to the accident (R. 125),
although ·he had previously tesitified that in July
of 1960 (which is prior to the accident) Mr. Soliz
had complained of low back pain without radiation.
On cross exramination Dr. Smith testified that the
plaintiff had complained of numbness in his right
arm at the time of an examination on November
12, 1960 and that on September 15, 1961 he sent
:\Ir. Soliz to Dr. Winter, a person who specializes
5
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in taking x-rays, because Mr. Soliz was complaining
of some kind of difficulty in his shoulder ( R. 134).
After the accident, on May 9, 19'62, the doctor
again sent Mr. Solitz back to Dr. Winter for x-rays.
These x-rays revealed no evidence of any intervertebral or ruptured disc ( R. 135) but did show a
condition of hypertrophic arthritis, which the doctor testified is a "lipping of the vertebrae . . .
that comes out on the side that ca:lcifies" (R. 136).
He concluded his testimony on cross examination
by stating that plaintiff had complained of the same
symptoms before the accident as he had afterward,
but thiat the symptoms seemed to be increased after
the acciden1t ( R. 1'36) .
When questioned about it, the plaintiff Eddie
Soliz admitted he had seen Dr. Smith for pains in
his back in July of 19'60 and that he had an area
of numbness in his right arm, shoulder and fingers
prior to the accident, which were the same complaints which he had after the accident ( R. 320) .
The plaintiff was referred by Dr. Smith to
Dr. D. C. Bernson, a neurosurgeon, who was plaintiff's second witness in the trial (R. 144). He examined the plaintiff on May 23, 1'962, who gave
him a history that he had been involved in an automobile accident in March, 1962 and had felt stiff
and sore but these symptoms gradually 'subsided.
He stated also that about three to three and onehalf weeks after the accident he began to experience stiffness and some weakness in bdth hands,
6
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which was noticeable primarily in the morning when
he would first awake and arise from bed. After
being up and around for a while, using his hands,
these symptoms would subside and would remain
absent for the remainder of the day ( R. 146) . Mr.
Soliz related that he had had the usual childhood
diseases and 1an appendectomy but denied any other
serious physical disturbance or ill health other than
some nervousness (R. 147). (Evidently plaintiff
did not mention the numbness in his arm that he
had experienced before the accident.) On the first
examination Dr. Bernson found plaintiff's systems
to be all within norm1al limits and also found that
plaintiff was well developed, nourished and healthy.
He did not seem to be in any acute distress, nor did
he appear seriously ill.
The doctor further testified that the significant findings were limilted to those pertinent to the
plaintiff's neck and primarily to his arms. The
doctor testified there !appeared to be a slight weakness of the grasp in both upper extremities (R.
148). Following his initial examination Dr. Bernson secured some further x-rays and had him report back in about a month's time, and then again
about six weeks later (R. 148). During this period
of time the doctor testified thJat the grip strength
of the plaintiff's hands had changed ·and that
changes had occurred in his reflexes in his arm,
and that he advised plaintiff to be hospitalized for
further diagnostic study (R. 148).
7
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Thereafter plaintiff was hospi1talized and a
discogram was performed. The doctor explained a
discogram as a special x-ray m1ade to demonstrate
an intervertebral disc ( R. 152). A special substance,
which ca'Sts a shadow on the x-ray similar to that
which would be cast by a bone, is inserted into the
discs between the vertebrae of the back with a needle
similar to a hypo needl~e or spinal needle. If the
disc is abnorma'l and ruptured the substance or dye
will leak out through the rupture and this can be
seen on the x-ray by seeing 'the course of the dye
as it outlines the defect in the disc (R. 153).
1

1

Dr. Bernson explained this procedure in great
detaH, stating he examined the x-rays which nr.
Winter had taken of the cervical spine, which were
to all intents ·and purposes normal on the plain
films. The only thing which he saw of any significance was a slight increase in motion between the
5th and 6th vettebrae as compared with the others.
Based on the information contained 'in these x-rays
and his know ledge of the vertebrae involved in this
type of an injury (R. 1'54) the dye was injected in
the discs between the 4th, 5th and 6th cervical vertebrae ( R. 1'5'3) . 'The doctor further testified that
he examined the x-rays taken at the time the discogram was done and that these x-rays demonstrated
a rupture of the upper two of the three discs tha:t he
had injected, namely the 4th and 5th (R. 157).
The doctor's recommendation on the basis of this
diagnosis was that Mr. Soliz shoU'ld consider having
1
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these discs removed, provided his symptoms and discomfort and incapacitation, whatever it might be,
was sufficient to warrant it. The plaintiff, Eddie
Soliz, told Dr. Bernson that he preferred to wait
until the symptoms went away or until they got
bad enough to justify an operation (R. 158).
Anticipating the testimony of defendant's doctor, plaintiff's counsel then asked Dr. Bernson, uin
an area where you have ruptured discs, two ruptured cervical discs as you found i'n Mr. Soliz, what
would you expect as to hypertrophic arthritic
changes as time passes?" After o'lJj~ection the doctor
was permitted to answer, and testified, ''The presence of hypertrophic changes on the margins of
the vertebrae due to degenerated or ruptured discs
is the usual state of affairs found in those cases of
long standing." Plaintiff'~s counsel then asked the
doctor, "Presuming that Mr. Soliz suffered two
ruptured cervical discs as you've indicated is your
opinion in this accident in March of 196'2, what
would you expect x-rays taken in September of
1963 to show with respect to arthritic changes where
these discs are?" After objection the doctor testified, "It's difficult to answer what I would expect.
I can state that this is possible. It also could be
that there may not be. It may take longer tim'e tha~
that for them to develop." (R. 167)
Again, on page 168 of the 'Record, the doctor
testified that "If one analyzes or understands the
significance of these hypertrophic spurs or changes,
9
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these in and of themselves are of no consequence
and cause no symptoms until they become extreme
in size and even then may not cause trouble. However, they do form because there has been a derangement of the disc-vertebrae relationship."
Dr. Bernson was cross examined at some length,
none of which is significant except that he re-asserted his opinion, stating that his diagnosis was based
on a total summation of all things taken into account, including the exami'nation, the history, the
x-rays and findings, the discogram findings and the
onset of symptoms referrable or occurring subsequent to the purported injury (R. 170). He was
further examined in regard to hypertrophic changes,
which he defined as follows: "You have an opening
formed where the nerve roots coming out betw·een
two bones. Now, if the m~argins of these bones become hypertrophic and spurs start forming and they
sufficiently encroach on this opening beyond the the nerve root isn't as large as the opening. They
can get a certain size before they reach a critical
point. If they do then you're going to have symptoms
from it." He further admitted the symptoms are
the same 'as those found in a ruptured di'sc (R. 176).
He concluded his cross examination by stating
that he would not recommend an operation unless
the patient wanted it, and based on the symptoms
recited by the plain tiff he did not recommend surgery (R. 185).
On re-direct exami\na tion the doctor testified
10
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that he did not observe in his examination of the
of Mr. Soliz any hypertrophic arthritic
changes sufficient to cause the nerve root pressure
or the troubles which he had attributed to the damaged discs ( R. 186), and that there was no rel'ationshi p whatsoever between hypertrophic changes which
he claimed were in the lumbar region and the symptoms which were referrable to the cervical region.
During the course of Dr. Bernson's examination the plaintiff did not introduce any of the
x-rays taken by Dr. Winter, those taken at the time
the discogram was performed or any other x-rays
about which Dr. Bernson had testified or upon
which he stated that he had based his opinion.
The trial of this action did not proceed as fast
as had been anticipated and on the afternoon of the
second day of the trial the court noted the presence
of Dr. Reed S. Clegg, the defendant's witness (R.
274). Although the plaintiff had not yet rested, the
defendant was permitted to call Dr. Clegg as his
witness out of order. Dr. Clegg testified that he
was a Member of the American Board of Orthopedic Surgery and had practiced orthopedic surgery in Balt Lake City, after compl'eting his training, since December of 1945 ( R. 276). He testified
that he had examined the plamtiff at the request
of the defendant on September 6, 1963. Dr. Clegg
took a history from Mr. Soliz which was substantially the same as Mr. Soliz had related ~to the other
two doctors, m;ade a physical examihation of Mr.
x- rays

11
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Soliz and x-rays were taken of the cervical, thoracic and lumbar areas of Mr. Soliz' spine under his
supervision. These x-rays were marked as Exhibits
D-7, D-8 and D-9 (R. 280) and recei~d in evidence. Exhibit 'D-7 i s a side view of the cervical
spine or neck. Exhibit D-8 is the same view of the
thoracic spine. Exhibi1t D-9 is a similar view of
the lumbar spine. Dr. Clegg testified that all of these
x-ray.s taken of the lumbar, thoracic and cervical
areas of the spine show some white changes about
the margins of the vertebrae and some honey lipping or calcium or bone deposits which are known
as spurs or hypertrophic spurs and are typical of
osteoarthritis ('R. 281). On the basis of these x-~ays
and his examination his diagnosis of the condition
of which the pla1n tiff complained was osteoarthritis
or hypertrophic arthritis ( R. 27'9) . He further testified that in his opinion any sign's of injury which
Mr. Soliz had sustained in the accident of March
2'1, 19'62 had healed prior to His examination (R.
282) ·and that if a person receives an accident or a
traum~atic i'ntervertebral disc injury they would be
aware of it at the ·time of their injury (R. '283.)
He further gave as his opinion that he would not
anticipate sufficient progre'S's in 'Mr. Soiiz' osteoarthritis to require any surgical fusion in the future
('R. '29'9) .
1

At the conclusion of the second day of trial
plaintiff's counsel was asked about further witn'esses, other than Mr. Soliz who had been testify12
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ing at the time Dr. Clegg was put on the stand.
Counsel for plaintiff stated he might have· one medical rebuttal witness.
The following morning, after the conclusion
of Mr. Soliz' testimony, the pla:intiff recalled Dr.
D. C. Bernson to the stand. The plaintiff had the
x-rays which Dr. Bernson had testified about on
his first examination and on which he had based
his discussion and diagnosis marked a:s exhibits
(P-10 through P-17). When it became apparent that
plaintiff's counsel intended to have Dr. Bernson
elaborate on the testimony he had given on his first
examination, counsel objected to the testimony on
the ground that it was repetitious and prejudicial
and upon the further ground that plaintiff's counsel
should be limited to a rebuttal of 'Dr. Clegg's testimony (R. 334). Counsel further objected to the
exhibits on the ground that no proper foundation
had been laid for their admission, the people who
took the x-rays and how the films were taken had
not been identified and explained, and upon the
further ground that they were repetitious (R. 337).
Dr. Bernson was then permitted to testify concerning Exhibits P-10, 11, 12 and 13, x-rays of the
plaintiff's spine taken by Dr. Winter on M~ay 9,
1962. He testified that Exhibit P-10 was of the
dorsal spine and showed hype trophic changes (non
traumatic) that had been testified to. He wa'S permitted to identify Exhibits P-11, 12 and 13 as
x-rays of the cervical area of the spine in extension
13
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and flexion and give his opinion there were no hypertrophic changes in the spine as shown by these x-rays
(R. 3\3'9). The x-ray taken by Dr. Clegg (Exhibit
D-7) was referred to him. Comparing that with the
others, he found that the latter x-ray taken by Dr.
Clegg did show hypertrophic arthritic changes ( R.
340).
Dr. Bernson was then permitted to re~tate his
opin'ion given on his first examination in a different
way. He was asked if he lrad a:ny opinion as to Why
there was a difference between the two x-rays (R.
34'1) and gave as his opinion ~that, "Thes·e are the
typical changes that begin following ·a derangement
of disc, rupture of the intervertebral dilscs."
Dr. Bernson ide·ntified Exhibits P-14, 15, 16
and 17 as the x-rays taken at the time the discogram was done, which procedure he had discussed
in detail in his previous 'testimony. He identified
Exhibits P-16 and 17 as Polaroid pictures of the
x-rays 'identified as Exhibi'ts P-14 and 15. He was
then perm~tted, on the pretense of explaining the
x-rays, to review hi:s opinion that the x-rays P-14
through P-1 7 taken at the time the discogram was
do'ne showed that the man had ~SUstained an intervertebral or ruptured disc ( R. 343). No explanation was ·ever given as to why these Exhibits were
not available at the time Dr. Bernson first testified,
nor why they were not introduced at 'that time.
By way of summary of this medical evidence,
Dr. Bernson in his first 'appearance on the stand
14
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testified that the plaintiff had sustained an intervPrtebral or ruptured disc in the cervical area of
his spine at the time of the accident and the injury
he complained of was not, in hi's opinion, due to
hypertrophic arthritis or osteoarthritis. Dr. Clegg
refuted this testimony, stating that in his opinion
his examination and 1the x-rays revealed that the
plaintiff was suffering from hypertrophic or osteoarthritis and that this i's a part of ~he aging process
not related to the injury. Dr. Bernson in his second
appearance on 'the stand was permitted to reiterate
the opinion given ·on his first appearance, that the
condition of the plaintiff's back, including any hypertrophic ·arthritis, was due to an intervertebral
or ruptured disc.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT LI'MI'TING DR.
BERNSON'S TESTIMONY GI'VEN UPON HIS SECOND
APPEARANCE IN THE TRI.A:L TO THAT WH'ICH
l\fiGHT BE ·CONSIDERED A REBUTTAL OF MATTERS
TESTIFIED TO BY DEFENDANT'S DOCTOR.

The rules of trial procedure are, it appe'ars to
us, designed not only to prescribe an orderly manner of proceeding in the trial of an action but to
provide for the reception of evidence in such a manner as to insure justice between the parties. Thus
the plaintiff, who brings the action, is required to
present his case. The defendant must then present
his defense. Obviously, if defendant has simply met
the proof of the plaintiff by denial, an explanation
1'5
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or otherwise and has not introduced anything new
into the case both parties have then had a fair opportunity to be heard. Obviously were the plaintiff
then ·allowed to prove hi!s case for a second time the
defendant would be prejudiced, unless we were to
permit defendant to present his defense :for a second time. This latter alternative would, of course,
be preposterous since this could go on ad infinitum,
a third time, a fourth time and so on. The rule which
the courts have, therefore, adopted is as stJalted in
53 Am. Jur.101:

''While the trial court is vested with wide
discretion in permitting departures from the
usual order of proof when circumstances of
the case require, th'e general rule is thait the
patty who has the burden of proof - he who
holds the affirmative ·and who would be defeated if no evidence were offered on either
side - is en ti tied to open the evidence; he
should then introduce all his evidence in chief,
and after his adversary has introduced all
his evidence in chief, the former should be confined to rebuttal evidence. Generally speaking,
on rebuttal ·he can give only such ev'idence
in reply as tends to an~swer new mlatter introduced by his adversary."
It is our contention that this rule was violated
'by the trial court to the prejudice of the defendant
herein when the trial court permitted Dr. Bernson
to 'testify for a second time as to m'atters which he
had already testified to on nis firs1t appearance.
The issue to Which the testimony of Dr. Bernson and Dr. Clegg in this case was addressed was
1
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whether or not the plain tiff, Eddie Soliz, had sustained any injuries as a result of the automobile
accident of M1arch 21, 1962 and, if 'SO, the nature and
extent of those injuries. The issue was not what was
shown on any particular x-ray, except to the extent
that these x-rays furni·shed the basis for the doctors'
ultim·ate conclusions that plaintiff did or did not
sustai'n injury 1and the nature and extent thereof.
Dr. Bernson in his first appearance 1te·sfified
in detail as to the history given to him by the plaintiff, the complaints which the plaintiff had made to
him and the examinations which 'he had m1ade of
the plaintiff. H·e tes1tified in detail as to the procedure performed in doing a discogram, how dye inserted in'to the cervical area of the neck would show
on x-rays made at the time land what the x-rays
taken of Mr. Soliz' back at the time of the discogram would show. Pre-supposing a proper identification, these x-rays would have been admissible
as a foundation for the doctor's dilagnos'is. Ba~sed on
these diagnostic tools and procedures, Dr. B·ernson
arrived at the opinion that the plaintiff had sustained a ruptured intervertebral dis'c a:t the time
of or following the acciden:t :and that his complaints
after the accident and at the time of the 'trial were
related to this condition. He did not, however, stop
here but, anticipating the defense, went on to testify that plaintiff's complaints were not the result
of any hypertrophic or arthritic changes which had
occurred in the plain tiff's back.
17
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I't was unfortunate that the defendant, in order
to accommodate the court and Dr. Clegg, was forced
to eall his doctor before the plaintiff hJad rested, but
i't would be a manifest injustice to penalize the defendant simply because he chose to accommodate
the court and the doctor in this manner. Dr. Clegg's
testimony did not introduce anything new into the
case. It was addressed to the same issue as that of
Dr. Bernson, the question of whether or not the
plaintiff, Eddie Soliz, had sustained any injury as
a result of the accident and the nature and extent
thereof. Based on ~the history which he took, h'iS
exami'n1ation and his x-rays 'Dr. Clegg simply arrived at a different conclusion than Dr. Bernson,
tha;t is, that the plaintiff's complaints at the time
of the trial were related to a condition of hypertrophic arthritis or osteoarthrit"iis and if the plaintiff were injured at the time of the accident he had
recovered from such injuries and they were not
apparenlt at the time of Dr. Clegg'1s examination.
The defendant did introduce three x-~ays, Exhibits
D..;7, D.:s and D-9, which constituted in part a foundation for Dr. Clegg's ultimate conclusion. He testified that these x-rays evidenced a condition of hypertrophic or osteoarthri ti1s.
1

rt may have been proper for the eourt to permit
Dr. Bernson to take the stand again and testify
whether in his opinion ~the x-rays, D-'7, 'D-8, and D-9
did or did not show a condition of hypertrophic or
osteoarthritis, which Dr. Bernson in fact did do, he
18
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being of the opinion that they did show such a condition. It may even have been proper to put him
back on the stand to ask him if in his opinion such
a condition was consistent with his previously expressed opinion that the plaintiff had sustained a
ruptured disc. But when the court permitted him
to go further and to introduce the exhibi'ts to which
Dr. Bernson had previously testified, those taken by
Dr. Winter (P-10 through P-13) and those taken
at the time of the discogram (P-14 through P-17) the
eoul't, in our opinion, erred. Under the guise of
comparing the x-rays, Dr. Bernson was simply given an opportunity to re-express his previously expressed opinion that the plaintiff had sustained a
ruptured intervertebral disc.
More important than this, however, i's that he
was in effect given an opportunity to argue, which
of course is not the function of :a witn~s's, that his
opinion was more valid than that expressed by Dr.
Clegg.
This Court has held tha:t rebuttal evidence is
limited to evidence made necessary by the adverse
party's reply and that usually all rebuttal evidence
which has not been made necessary by the opponent's case in reply will be excluded. Adams v. Lang,
2 Utah (2d) 418, 275 Pac. (2d) 881. In that case
the plaintiff and appellant hlad sought in the court
below to elicit on rebuttal an expert's opinion as to
the speed of the defendant. The witnesses for the
appellant and the witnesses for the defendant had
19
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all testified that the defendant was traveling anywhere between 30 and 40 miles per hour. The court
below refused to admit the expert"s opinion, and this
Court sustained i t, saying:
1

" ... ks sta:ted by Wigmore on Evidence,
Third Ed., Sec.l873:
'It is 'clear that the orderly presentation of each party's case would leave the
proponent nothing ·to do, in his case in
rebuttal, except to meet the new f1acts
put in by the opponent in hi's case in
reply. Everything relevant as a part of
the ca'se in chief would naturally have
been already put in; and a rebuttal is
neceHSary only because, on a plea in den:Ual, new subordinate evidential facts
have been offered, or because, on an affirmative plea, its substantive flacts have
been put forward, or because, on any issue whatever, :facts discrediting the proponent's witnesses have been offered ... '
'Accordingly, it is well settled that,
while the occasional difficulity of discrimina1tion, and the frequency of inadvertent
omi1ssions iand unexpected con tests, add
emphasis to the general principle of the
trial Court's discretion (ante, Sec. 1867),
(it i'S always within the sound discretion
of the court to admit evidence out of the
pre'scribed customary order) yet the usual rule will exclude all evidence which
has not been made neces'Sary by the opponent's case in reply ... '
"Appellant could have introduced the expert's opinion in her caJse in chief, no't having
20
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done so, and under the facts of this case, it
not being proper rebuttal, the court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to admit it
after she had rested her case in chief."
Nor may a pl:aintiff reserve a portion of his
testimony which ~should be offered in his case and
then use this testimony in rebuttal of defendant's
testimony. In a California case, Bates v. Newman,
264 Pac. 197, the plaintiff withheld two colored
slides, which slides had been in his possession during
the presentation of his case in chief, and sought to
introduce the slides in rebuttal of the testimony of
defendant's doctor. The appellate court held 'that the
court below did not err in excluding the testimony,
and said:
"The law is established ~hat one who has
the affirmative of an issue may not reserve
a portion of his evidence until an opposite
party has exhausted his evidence to negative
that offered in the first ilnstance. If he does
so the court may refuse to allow him to in troduce additional evidence on the subject after
defendant rests. (Lipman v. kshburn, 106
Oal. App. 2d 616,620 (4), 235 P. 2a 627.)"
In the case referred to, Lipman v. Washburn,
106 Cal. App. 2d 616, 235 Pac. (2d) 6'2 7, the plaintiff sought to put on a Witness in hi's rebuttal testimony to the effect tha:t the truck did not stop
at a stop sign before entering the intersection. The
court held:
". . . Evidence that the truck did not
stop before entering the intersection was an
essential part of the case in chief. Plaintiff
1
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did not have a right to withhold her testimony for the purpose of offering it in rebuttal.
"It is well se'ttled that ~a pa~ty who has
the affirmative may not reserve a portion of
his evidence until the opposite p:arty has exhausted his to negative that offered in the
first instance, and if he does so, ·the court may
refuse to allow him ~to come in and make out
his case after the defendant rests ... "
In a Montana case, Gustafson v. Northern Pacific Railway Company, 351 Pac. f2d) 212, the
court held, in an action for wrongful death of a
motorist who was killed When rthe pickup truck he
waJs driving s'talled on a railroad track and was
struck by a train, the issue being the distance in
which a train could stop, tha:t a retired engineer's
testimony with respect ~to stopping distance·s was
a part of 'the plain tiff'1s case in chief and that the
court properly refused to permit such te'stimony
as rebuttal. In that case the court said:
"In her case in chief, plaintiff sought
to prove the maximum distance that would
be required to stop a train such as the one
involved in the accident. The defendants, in
their case, called three expert witnesses for
the purpose of proving the distance required
'to stop such a train. 'The evidence :adduced
from defendants' witnesses differed considerably from that presented in plaintiff's case,
and tended to show that a greater distance
was required. On rebuttal, plaintiff called a
reti'red engineer, Charles Buls, 'and ~sougHt to
get his opinion on 'the required stopping dis22
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tance through the use of a hypothetical question. Defendants objected on the ground of improper rebuttal, and the objection was sustained. Plaintiff argues that Buls' testimony
was proper rebuttal, in that it tended to disprove, repel, and counteract the evidence of
the defendants. Section 9'3-5101, R.C.M. 1947,
requires that after the plaintiff and defend:ant have presented their case in Chief, they
will thereafter be confined to rebutting evidence. That which plaintiff sought to introduce through witness Buls was clearly part
of her ca:se in chief and was not rebutting
evidence, 'vhich Is confined to that which tends
to counteract new matter offered by the 'adverse pa~ty. The court properly sus'tained the
objecti'on."
In an Oregon vase, Henderson v. Union Pacific
Railroad Company, 219 Pac. (2d) 170, the question
before the court was, wha!t was the cause of the
plaintiff's loss of leg. The dase i's best summarized
in the words of the court:
"In his case in chief the plaintiff introduced no evidence concerning any pre-existing diseased condition. Hi's only medical witness, Dr. Howard H. Mintz, testified in chief
on the basis of a hypothetical question that
'the plaintiff's injury would ltave called for
immediate medical attention, and plaintiff
rested his case without any medieal evidence
whatever that the injury caused the lo'ss of
his leg. The defendant then established by
uncontradicted evidence that the plaintiff, at
the time of the injury, was suffering from
arteriosclerosis in his left leg, which, in the
opinion of Dr. Dodson, who amputated the
1
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leg, and Dr. Frank R. Menne, the pathologist who examined the leg after the amputation, was so severe that it caused ~angrene
to s~t in, necessitating amputation. Thereafter, in rebuttal, the plaintiff undertook to
prove the charge in his complaint (made in
the alternative) that the cause of !amputation was aggravation of the arteriosclerosis
by the blow. The court, without oiJjection on
the part of the plaintiff, submitted 'the question of aggravation to the jury as the only
ques'ti on for their consideration on this ph:ase
of the case. Counsel for the plain1tiff expressly
conceded on the oral argument here that the
plainti'ff had 'a pronounced condition of arteriosclerosis' and that the issue in the case
was whether 'the arteriosclerosis caused the
gangrene just by that disease developing of
itself' or the disease was 'aggravated and
lighted up by receiving thi's blow on the leg
by this flying, heavy chisel.'
1

"From the foregoing it will be seen that
what the plaintiff did was to attempt to
prove in rebuttal, instead of in his case in
chief, that the alleged accident was the proximate cause of aggravation of arteriosclerosis
1and the consequent loss of his leg. ThiiS procedure was objected to by the defendant, and
the adverse ruling is assigned as error. It is
unnecessary to pas·s on the question, since the
judgment must be reversed for other reasons.
It should be observed, however, fuat, whatever may have been the justification for this
novel course, there will be no excuse whatever for any simil'ar procedure on another
trial. It will then be the duty of the plaintiff
to establish the fact of aggravation of 1a pre24
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existing diseased condition (if 'that is what
he continues to rely upon) as a part of his
case in chief, and he should not be permitted
to reserve for his rebuttal the proof of proximate cause, thus seeming to cast upon the
defendant the burden of showing that the
allPged aggravation was not the proximate
cause of the loss of plaintiff's leg."
It is our contention tha t there was nothing new
introduced into this case by fue opinion of Dr. Clegg,
who simply disagreed with the dilagnosis of Dr.
Bernson and described ·a different condition than
Dr. Bernson had described. Therefore, the evidence
adduced from Dr. Bernson in his ·second appearance
was improper if intended to meet the opinion of Dr.
Clegg in that 'there wa·s nothing new in the case
·which called for rebuttal or, if not considered in that
light, Was improper since it attempted to intro'duce
in rebuttal evidence which was properly a part of
the plaintiff's case in chief and should have been
introduced as part of hi's testimony at that time.
1

POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW
X-RAYS RECEIVED AS EXHIBITS IN THE CASE TO
BE TAKEN INTO THE JURY ROOM.

At the time this case went to 'the jury the court
did not allow the defendant's x-rays (Exhibits D-7,
D-8 and D-9) and the plaintiff''s x-rays (Exhibits
P-10, P-11, P-12, P-13, P-14 and P-15) to go to
the jury, but did allow plaintiff's Exhibits P-16
and P-17 (which were photographs in black and
25
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white of x-rays taken, P-14 and P-1'5) to go to the
jury. The defendant excepted to thi1S 'and further
asse~ted that if the jury was going to get a part of
'the x-rays they should have them all ( R. 35'6). The
court stated his reason for hrs action as follows (R.
356):
"By way of clarification on that matter,
the ·Oourt might state for the record it's ~this
Court's understanding 1tha't P-16 and P-17
were not photographs of the corresponding
numbered X-rays, but were independent
photographs taken on Polaroid film and were
then a matter of seconds or the most minutes
apart from same. And rt appeared to the Court
thJa:t these Polaroid positive photographs could
at least to ·an extent be interpreted by lay
persons, to-wit: the jury; whereas X-~ays
themselves with or without a viewbox arealmost impossible of intelligible interpretation
by lay people, no-wit: a jury. You m'ay proceed.''
The court was in error in stating that P-16
and P-17 were not photographs 'Of the corre'sponding numbered x-rays hut independent photographs.
Dr. Bernson 'testified (R. 336):
"'These 1are essentially identical 'to the
X-rays. However, they are Polaroid exposures
or films taken which makes a posi'tive instead of a negative. 'This i's done because 'they
can be developed in ten seconds and we can
examine fuem rather 'than sitting waiting
somewhere in the neighbbrhood of ten or
twelve minutes ·to develop 1the film. So these
were just to check the film1s for a permanent
record.. "
1
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It would appear to us that the court's action
was prejudicial in two respects. First, the Exhibits
constituted evidence in the case and the jury should
have before i't all of the evidence introduced at the
tri al on which to base their verdict. More important,
however, in our mind is the fa~t that the court let
the jurors take Exhibits P-16 and P-17 (which were
pictures taken at the time the discogram was performed and which, in Dr. Bernson's opinion, showed
a ruptured disc) but did not allow the x-rays taken
by Dr. Clegg (Exhibits D-7 through D-9) to be
taken in to the jury room. There appears to be no
reason why a jury is more competent to interpret
a black and whi te photograph of the spine and what
i't shows than they are to interpret the usual x-ray.
And the withholding of one set of exh'ibits and the
submission of the other would seem to constitute a
representation by the court, itself, that those Exhibits which he allows to go into the jury room are
worthy of belief and that those which he withholds
are not worthy of belief.
1

1

The propriety of permitting the jury to take
x-ray pictures introduced into evidence w1fu them
into the jury room has been annotated in 10 A.L.R.
(f!d) 918. Generally speaking, in all of the cases
contained in the annotation the complaint was the
opposite of that asserted here, the complaint being
that It was error to allow the x-rays to be 'taken
into the jury room. In every ca:se cited in the annotation it was held that x-ray photographs constitute
27
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evidence to be taken, or which may be taken by the
jury into the jury room after they retire to deliberate on the verdict.

Rule 47(m) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure would appear to be conclusive of the matter.
!The rule provides:
"Upon retiring for 'deli'bera!tion the jury
m1a.y take with them the instructions of the
court and all exhibits and all papers which
have been received as evidence in the cause,
except depositions or copies of such papers as
ought not, in the opinion of the court, to be
taken from the person having them in possession ; and they may !also take with them notes
of the testimony or other proceedings on the
trial taken by themselve's or any of them, but
none taken by any other pe:rson."
According to the case of Jensen v. Dibel, 69
N.W. (2d) 108 (Minnesdta)
"The better practice would be Ito introduce in evidence, for whatever purpose allowed by trial court any objeets such 'as models,
tools, equipment useld by experts for illustration, explanation, or experiments or other
objects which counsel m'ay want to have sent
wrth the jury during deliberations."
The court did indicate in tha:t case, however, that
the court may, with proper instructions, withhold
or restrict 'the use of exhibits by the jury, which was
not done in tllis case.
The case of White v. Walker, 273 N.W. 499
(Iowa), illustrates the harm of w!thholding exhi28
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bits from the jury, especiaJly if no explanation is
given to the jurors as to the reason the exhibits are
being withheld. In that case exhibits were withdl~awn from the jury after the jury had gone out
to commence their deliberations. The lower court
decided i't had erred in this respect and granted a
new trial. The appellate court, in sustaining the
granting of a Motion For New Trial, sai1d:
"The court was within i'tJs province in
holding thia!t the jury might have got a wrong
and prejudicial impression as to the admissibility and importance of 'the exhibits from the
fact ~hat they were withdrawn summarily
from their consideration without explanation."
Commenting upon the court'·s opinion that 'the
x-rays could not be understood by the jury, it was
said in Tea~as Employers Insurance AssocW,tion v.
Crow, 221 S.W. (2d) 2'35, that x-rays sought to be
introduced into the evidence could not be excluded
on the ground that they were technical and unintelligible to the average juror.
Thus, it is seen 'that the court erred in this case
in withholding Exhibits D-7 through D-9 land P-1 0
through P-15 from the jury, ·and that this error
was prejudicial to the defendant in that i!t might
have created the impression in the minds of the jury
that the court did not consider the evidence shown
by those exhibits, that is the testimony of Dr. Clegg
which is illustmted by Exhibits D-7 through D-9
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and the evidence of pre-existing difficulty in the
back as illustrated by Exhibi1ts P-10 through P-13,
important.
POINT HI.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS
GIVEN TO THE JURY.

The instruction which the defendant deems prejudicial in 'this case is the court's Instruction No. 8,
the first part of which reads as follows ( R. 43) :
"A motorist who haJS the right of way
need not anticipa'te sudden outbreaks of negligence on the part of other drivers. In fact, the
failure to observe the happening of the negligent acts would be a proximate cause of the
coll'ision only when by observing, 1the motorist
who hiad tfue rigHt of way could have avoided
'the resulting collision."
In reading this instruction we must keep in
mind that the court had already found negligence
on the part of 'the defendant and that the issue before the jury was the question of whether or not
the plaintiff, Eddie Soliz, was guilty of contributory negligence. The error in the instruction, in our
opinion, When read in light of the fact tha:t the court
had previously found liability on the part of the
defendan1t, is that it constitutes a finding by the
court that Eddie Soliz had the right of way; that
the negligence on 'the part of the defendant was a
'sudden outbreak of negligence' and that pl'aintif
had no duty whatsoever to observe any negligence
on the part of the defendant.
30
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Not only was the law incorrectly stated, but
there was no necessity for the statement in view of
Instruction No. 12, wherein the jury was properly
instructed ( R. --17) :
" ... Moreover, a person who, himself, is
exercising ordinary care has a right to assume
that dthers, too, will perform their duties
under the l~w and has a further right to rely
on ~that assumption. Thus, it is not negligence
for such a person to fail to anticipate injury
Which can come to him or others only from
a violation of law or duty by !another. However, an exception should be noted: The right
just defined does not exist when it is reasonably apparent to one, or in the exercise of
ordinary care should be apparent to him,
that another is not going to perform his duty."
In the case of Webb v. Snow, 102 Utah 435,
132 Pac. (2d) 114, it was held that the court, in
giYing instructions, must not resolve conflicts in
the evidence for the jurors nor indicate what particular testimony 'the trial court believes correctly
states the facts. That was a case :for assault and
battery in which the plaintiff claimed that she was
struck by an employee of the defendant and injured.
The court instructed the jury
"The court instructs you that if you believe from the evidence that the plla;intiff was
pregnant at the time she was rendered unconsC'ious by the blow delivered by one of the
defendan'ts' employees, and as a result of said
blow and being knocked to the floor she suffered a miscarriage and thereby 'the loss of
31
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her unborn child, you may award her money
damages for the loss of said unborn child."
(Italics added. )
The court further said:
"The foregoing instruction disregarded
entirely 'the fact thaJt there was considerable
dispute and conflict in the evidence. The ins~ruction, standing alone, would amount to
an 'instruction to find in favor of the plaintiff if the jury found tha;t plaintiff was pregnant at the time she was struck, and if they
also found that a miscarriage re·sul'ted. 'The
instruction assumes that defendants' employees were to blame for what occurred, and that
the evidence was uncontradicted as to the following: (1) ThaJt plaintiff was 'rendered unconscious' by the 'blow,' and (2) that she was
knocked to the floor. The instruction is so
worded that it indicaJted to ·fue jury a belief
on ~the part of the court that defendan'ts' employees were hi:aJmeworthy irrespective of the
acts of plaintiff. As stated in State v. Seymour, 49 Utah 285, 163 P. 789, 792: ~courts,
in charging jurors, should be very careful not
to assume any material fact or facts. Jurors,
who are laymen, :are always eager to follow
the opinion or judgment of the court, and if
the court assumes any material fact 'in the
charge, the jurors are most likeiy to follow the
as'Sumptions of the court. Indeed, we must
a;ssume that su~h is ~the case unless the record
clearly shows the cont~ary.'"
Another instruction of this type was involved
in the ca:se of I vie v. Richar!Mon, 9 Utah (2d) 5,
3 36 Pac. ('2d) 781. That was 'an acti on brought by
1

1
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a pedestrian for injuries sustained while crossing
the street between crossings. In that case the court
said:

"Of more importance is the error assigned in giving Instruction No. 10. It sta:tes that
the driver of a vehicle, '* * * emerging from
• * • any * * * driveway, or building, shall
stop such vehicle immediately prior to driving on to a sidewalk * * * and shall yield
the right of way to any pedestri;an * * * to
aYoid collision, * * *.' This instruction is a
correct state1nent of the law, but it is not
applicable to the instant fact situation. The
pra.in tiff was ndt on a sidewalk or a sidewalk
area. The failure of the defendant to stop, if
he did, had no causative effect in this incident. No1· was the plaintiff in any area where
she necessarily had the right of way over the
defendant. It was simply a situation where
each had the duty to use due care for the
safety of themselves and each other. The
~1bnYe instruction might well have had the
effect, as the defendant contends, of giving
the jury the impression that the plaintiff was
entitled to the right of way, iand therefore
was in error in this fact situation."
1

POINT IV.
THE VERDICT OF THE ·JlURY IS EXCESSIVE
A~D APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE
INFLUE~CE OF PASSION OR PREJUDICE.

The prejudicial effect of the cumulative error
committed by the court in this case is reflected in
the verdict of the jury. Although the plainltiff had
only incurred $446.25 special damages he recovered
a general verdict in the amount of $15,000.00 (R.
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33). Thiis in spite of the testimony of his own doctor, David E. Smith, that the plaintiff had had tile
same complaints prior to the accident of March 21,
19'62 as those he had afterward but that the symptoms seemed to increase after the accident, and the
plain tiff's own admission to the same effect. It
means tha:t 'the jury must not have taken into cons'ideration the fact that there was no immediate
complaJint of pain in the back at the time of the
accident, nor until some three weeks later, which
is ndt the usual pattern when an intervertebral disc
is sustained. It completely ignores 'the testimony of
Dr. Clegg to the effect that the plaintiff's present
condition is a result of hypertrophic or osteoarthritis
and not a ruptured disc. It Shows no consideration of
Dr. Clegg's testimony to the effect that plaintiff
had completely recovered from any ailment which
he may have suffered as a resu]t of the accident.
The verdict does not reflect any ;consideDation having
been given to the fact that the plaintiff had not at
the time of the trial had an operation on his back;
nor 'bo lthe fact 'that his own doctor did not recommend one at the time; nor the possibility that an
opeDation may not be required.
The jury seems to have bought the story of Dr.
D. C. Bernson Hhook, line and sinker", but i't is submitted 'that tnis could have easily been anticipated
from the fact that the court erroneously permitted
Dr. Bernson to testify ·to the same thing on two
occasions, and then indicated its approval of Dr.
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BPrnson's tPstimony by withholding from the jury
all of the exhibits in the case except those illustrating the discogram to which Dr. Bernson had testified.
The fact that a verdict is greater than another
jury or the Supreme Court migh't award, or even
more than the evidence justifies, does not conclusively show that it was the result of passion, prejudice or caprice on the part of the jury so as to
necessarily entitle the defendant to a new trial,
Pauly v. JltlcCarthy, 184 Pac. (2d) 123, 109 Utah
-131.

On the other hand, as said in Stamp v. Union
Pacific Railroad Company, 5 Uta!h (2d) 397, ·303
Pac. ( 2d) 279,
"Not every verdict that 'appears to be
excessive will warrant a new trial or a reduction in the award, but the consideration which
a court owes to a jury cannot be permitted to
blind our eyes where the award can be accounted for only by the presence of passion
or prejudice."
"'"ere this simply a matter of a difference of
opinion as to the reasona:bleness of the jury's award
in this case and were there no error in 'the record
on which the jury may have gone awry, this might
simply be a case where the defendant is a:sking this
Court to substitute its op'inion for that of the jury.
That is not the point that the defendant wishes to
make in this case. His point is that the amount of
the verdict in this case shows the extent to which
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the defendant was prejudiced in the court below,
iand that by reason of the prejudice he is entitled
not to a reduction of the damages but 'to a new
trial. We submit that rthe court, in determining the
adequacy of the award in this case, should take into
consideration the record in the court below and determine whether or not the verdict was rendered under ~any misapprehension of ·tJhe evidence or instructions. As was said by this Court in Saltas v. Affleck,
99 Utah 381, 105 Pac. (2d) 176,
"As stated in the case of Hirabelli v. Daniels, 44 Utah 88, 138 P. 1172, and quoted with
approval in the recent case of Ch!atelain v.
Thackeray, Utah, 100 P. 2d 191,198: 'Weare
* * * slow to interfere witll a ruling granting
or refusing a new triaJ on questions relating
to damages.'
''While we so sltated, we also held tha:t the
amount of the verdict i's a matter exclusively
for the jury. On the ground of adequacy of
the verdict alone, the court may not interfere
with the jury's verdict. However, if inadequacy or excessiveness of the verdict presents
a situation that such inadequacy or excessiveness shows a disregard by the jury of the evidence or the instructions of the court 'as to
the law applicable to the case as to satisfy
the court that the verdict was rendered under
such disregard or misapprehension of the evidence or instructions or under ~he influence
of passion or prejudice then the court may
exercise its discretion in the interest of justice and grant a new trial. It may be that a
verdict small in :amount or large in amount
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is clearly the result of passion or prejudi~e.
It is seldom that the am'Oun t of the verdict
standing alone is so inadequate or excessive as
to indicate passion or prejudice. Miller v.
Southern Pacific Co., 82 Utah 46, 21 P. 2d
865. In order to eliminate speculation as to
the basis of the exercise of judicial discretion
in granting new trials, the record should show
the reasons and make it clear the court is not
invading the province of ~he jury. The trilal
court should indicate wherein there was a
plain disregard by the jury of the instructions
of the court or the evidence or what constituted bias or prejudice on 'the part of the
jury. If no reasons need be given the province
of the jury may be invaded at will. With no
indication as to the basis for exercise of the
power vested in the court to grant new trials
the appeal tribunal would be left to analyze
the rna tter from the evidence, the record and
the instructions. It would be required to search
out possible reasons :for agreeing or disagreeing with the trial court in the exercise of a
discretion. The exercise of a judicial discretion must be based upon some facts notwithstanding great latitude is accorded the trial
court in such ma:tter. Klinge v. Southern Pacific Co., 89 Utah 284, 57 P. 2d 3'67, 105 A.L.R.
204."
CONCLUSION
Although it has been ~ouched 'in legal language,
boiled down to its simplest terms, what the defendant in this case contends is 1Jhat he did not receive
a fair trial on the issues in the court below and
that by reason of this the verdi~t of the jury is more
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than might reasonably have been expected unde1
the evidence of injury and the medical evidence ir
the ca'Se. The action of the court below, in allowin~
the plaintiff's doctor to testify to the same rna tter
twice and in withholding from the jury the defendant's exhToits and those indicating a pre-existing injury, was such as 'to lend credence to the plaintiff's
claim ·and to influence the jury to return a verdict
which, in our opinion, is clearly excessive. As was
said by this Court in !vie v. Richardson, supra,
" ... The question is whether the case was
presented to the jury in such a manner that
it is reasonable to believe there was a fair
and impartial analysis of the evidence and a
just verdict. If errors were committed which
prevented this being done, then a new trial
should be granted, whether it resulted from
one error, or from several errors cumulatively. We expressly do not mean to say that trivia
which would be innocuous in themselves can
be added together to make sufficient error to
result in prejudice and reversal. The errors
must be real and substantial and such as m1ay
reasonably be supposed would affect the result. However, errors of the latter character,
whlich may not themselves justify a reversal,
may well, when considered together with
others, render i't clear that a fair trial was
not had. In 'Such event justice can only be
served by the granting of a new trial, :absent
the errors complained of . . ."
It is submitted that the errors inherent in the
record of this trial were substantial and were such
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as may reasonably have been supposed to have affected the result of the trial. It is, therefore, urged
that this Court grant the defendant a new tria:I.
Respectfully submitted,

HANSON & GARRETT
Attorneys for DeferukLnts
and Appellants

520 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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